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SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE THE END OF STORY: A
PROPOSED PROCEDURE TO SETTLE HATCH-WAXMAN
PARAGRAPH IV LITIGATIONS MODELED AFTER RULE 23
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
Chika Seidel*
I. INTRODUCTION
A brand-name pharmaceutical company typically obtains a patent
for its newly developed drug in order to protect its intellectual
property. If another company expresses its intent to market a generic
version of the drug, the Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes the brand-name
company to sue preemptively for patent infringement.1 Parties to the
lawsuit may settle at any time, but antitrust issues arise when the
settlement involves a “reverse payment” in exchange for delayed
generic entry (also called “pay for delay”). The Supreme Court in
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. described a reverse payment
settlement as follows:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The
two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company
B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented
product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A,
the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars.2
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) maintains that this type of
settlement violates antitrust laws because it “may lead to higher prices
for pharmaceuticals by deterring generic entry, and contribute to
increased health care costs that consumers, employers, and federal and
state governments are struggling to contain.”3 A counterargument,
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1
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2010).
2
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
3
Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Concurrences
Journal Annual Dinner: FTC v. Actavis and the Future of Reverse Payment Cases (Sept.
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however, is that an owner of a valid patent is immune from antitrust
violation because he or she has “the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout
the United States.”4 Pharmaceutical companies in the United States
are also free to set drug prices as they wish.5
Lower courts have long disagreed as to the standard by which to
analyze reverse payment settlement agreements for antitrust
violations.6 The Actavis Court resolved the dispute by deciding that
such agreements should be analyzed under the rule of reason,7 which
generally requires a fact finder to “weigh[] all of the circumstances of
a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice [e.g., a settlement]
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.”8 The Actavis decision has garnered much criticism for
its inadequate guidance,9 because the Court “[left] to the lower courts
the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”10 One
significant problem is that the Court did not rule out the possibility of
“litigat[ing] patent validity to answer the antitrust question,”11 which
defeats the purpose of settling patent infringement cases.
Furthermore, the Court did not address whether the term “payment”
encompasses non-monetary consideration. Lower courts already

26, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-cases/130926actavis.pdf.
4
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2013).
5
Valerie Paris, Why Do Americans Spend So Much on Pharmaceuticals?, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/
americans-spend-much-pharmaceuticals/ (discussing that the United States has
relatively low levels of price regulation of pharmaceuticals).
6
Compare, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), with
In re K–Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). Note that Actavis rejected the
standards put forth by both circuits.
7
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
8
Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (quoting
Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
9
See, e.g., Lars P. Taavola, Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch—Insight into How
Courts May Structure Reverse Payment Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions That Actavis
Left Unanswered, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1370 (2014); Kevin D. McDonald, Because I
Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 36,
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/0d7aa5fb-4f61-49b8-807de6ae4c967149/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c363cc02-6322-42ba-a447ea9d6eafaf61/Fall13-McDonaldC.pdf; James J. O’Connell, Editor’s Note: The Elephant
Remains, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 5, https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/
publications/2013/11/the_elephant_remains.pdf.
10
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.
11
Id. at 2236.
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disagree on this issue.12 Because of these ambiguities, pharmaceutical
companies struggle to structure their settlement agreements to avoid
antitrust scrutiny.
For private parties who wish to bring an antitrust action against
settled parties, an initial challenge lies in the identification of
settlement agreements—if they are even publicly available.13 Since
about 2004, pharmaceutical settlements have evolved to include a
complex mix of side deals as well as non-monetary considerations.14
Private parties must parse various transactions to determine whether
any of them are related to the potentially anticompetitive agreement.
Moreover, many private consumers are precluded from seeking
remedies under the federal or state antitrust statutes even if they have
been injured by overpriced drugs.15 The situation calls for drastic
measures to remedy these problems.
This Comment proposes that Congress adopt a mandatory
judicial approval procedure for settling Hatch-Waxman litigations.
The procedure is modeled after the process of settling class actions
pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). Part II explains
the relevant background information, including the regulatory and
legal developments as well as some of the existing problems associated
with Hatch-Waxman disputes. Part III describes the proposed
procedure in detail and explains why the proposed settlement
procedure is superior to the current settlement method. Part IV then
concludes by summarizing the proposed procedure and its benefits.

12

Compare, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 192 (D.R.I.
2014) (“Reading Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to
monetary settlements.”), with In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp.
3d 231, 262 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[U]nlawful reverse payments are not limited to
monetary payments.”).
13
The FTC and the Department of Justice have access to pharmaceutical
settlement agreements, but private parties do not. See Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat.
2066, 2461 (2003) [hereinafter MMA].
14
C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 649 (2009); BUREAU OF
COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012 (2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federaltrade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvementand/130117mmareport.pdf.
15
See infra footnotes 91–98 and accompanying text.
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II. RELEVANT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
This Comment can be better understood if the reader is familiar
with the legal and economic concerns surrounding the
pharmaceutical industry. Subsection A discusses the relationship
between the patent system and the pharmaceutical industry.
Subsection B describes the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its
pertinent provisions. Subsection C explains the antirust enforcement
mechanism and relevant issues. Subsection D summarizes the circuit
split that led to the Actavis decision, the Actavis opinion itself, and its
aftermath.
A. The Role of the Patent System in the Pharmaceutical Industry16
In order to sustain their businesses, brand-name companies17 must
recover their investments in drug development. An estimate shows
that “for every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that enter the discovery
pipeline, only five make it to clinical trials, and only one receives
approval” from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).18 The
development of a single new drug takes an average of ten to fifteen
years, and the research and development (R&D) investment per drug
can be anywhere from $1.2 billion19 to $5 billion.20 These high figures
are in part due to a high rate of failure—one commentator suggests
that 95% of the experimental medicines fail to be both effective and

16

This Comment primarily focuses on exclusivity rights conferred by the patent
system. The Hatch-Waxman Act and other legislation provide non-patent exclusivity
rights for certain new drug applicants. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii)–(iii),
355(j)(5)(F)(ii)–(iv), 355a, 360cc (2010).
17
For the sake of simplicity, this Comment refers collectively to all companies that
develop new drugs and file NDAs as “brand-name companies.” In reality, many
companies make both new and generic drugs.
18
PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., PHARM. INDUS. PROFILE 2012 30 (2012),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_industry_profile.pdf.
19
Id.
20
Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big
(Aug.
11,
2013,
11:10
AM),
Pharma
to
Change,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-costof-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/. Note that there are:
[s]ome caveats, though: drug companies have tax incentives to count
costs in research and development, which could inflate the figure; they
also are likely to spend extra money in order to get those medicines
approved in other countries. Even more important is the fact that some
R&D costs come from monitoring the safety of medicines after they
become hits to monitor reports of side effects.
Id.
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safe for human use.21 Even if drugs reach the market, only 20% of FDAapproved drugs will recoup the cost of R&D.22 Furthermore, brandname companies suffer a dramatic loss in profits when generic
products enter the market; competition causes the price of a patented
drug to plummet, and within a year of generic entry, an average
generic product “takes over ninety percent of the patent holder’s unit
sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand
product.”23
A successful, patent-protected drug is vital for innovators’
financial futures and their ability to reinvest in research endeavors.
The purpose of the United States patent system—“[t]o promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited
[t]imes to . . . [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their
[inventions]”24—is especially true for pharmaceutical innovations, as
“new product development in the pharmaceutical industry is more
dependent on patent protection than in many other industries.”25 One
study shows “that 60 percent of inventions within the pharmaceutical
industry would not have been” possible without the patent system.26
Insofar as brand-name companies are dependent on the patent
system to recover their R&D investments, there are indications that the
companies have gone too far. One strategy frequently employed by
brand-name companies is to obtain “secondary” patents, i.e., patents
protecting ancillary aspects of a drug other than its active ingredient.27
These secondary patents essentially extend the overall period of patent
protection for a particular drug, but they vary in strength. In fact,
many secondary patents are considered “weak,” meaning that they are

21

Id.
Intellectual Property Protections are Vital to Continuing Innovation in the
Biopharmaceutical Industry, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectualproperty (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“[O]nly 2 out of every 10 medicines will recoup
the money spent on their development.”).
23
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8
(2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-howdrug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staffstudy/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf).
24
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
25
Brief of Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (PHRMA) as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 7, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013
WL 769196, at *7.
26
Id.
27
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, SCI.,
Mar. 2013, at 1386.
22
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likely invalid or not infringed.28 The holder of a weak patent likely has
no right to block the sale of cheaper alternatives to its brand-name
drug.29 Thus, a settlement agreement that operates to exclude
competitors from the market is likely anticompetitive when it ends a
dispute over a weak patent. On the other hand, even if a settlement
excludes competition, it can be deemed pro-competitive if it allows
generic entry before the expiration of the patent, especially if the
patent is strong.30 In fact, the Actavis Court conceded that settlements
with terms permitting the generic company to enter the market before
the expiration of the patent “would . . . bring about competition . . . to
the consumer’s benefit.”31 This is because market entry by generic
companies and the resulting decrease in drug prices occur much
sooner than they would without such arrangement; all it takes is a
single strong patent for a brand-name company to completely
dominate the market.
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,32
to “strike a balance between two conflicting policy objectives: to induce
name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary
to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously
enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs
to market.”33 Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
FDA required brand-name and generic companies alike to submit
proof of drug safety and efficacy through a New Drug Application
(NDA).34 Brand-name companies were frustrated with the time28

See, e.g., id.; see also Allison A. Schmitt, Note, Competition Ahead? The Legal
Landscape for Reverse Payment Settlements After Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 493, 503 (2014) (noting that brand-name companies lose most
litigations on secondary patents).
29
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013).
30
Id. at 2237.
31
Id. at 2234.
32
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
33
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting
aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amendments):
Statement Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/
ucm115033.htm.
34
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2010); Barbara J. Williams, A Prescription for Anxiety: An
Analysis of Three Brand-Name Drug Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40
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consuming FDA approval process: the longer the process took, the
shorter their remaining patent terms became,35 and the more money
they lost to generic competition.36 Generic companies were also held
back by the pre-Hatch-Waxman requirement to “re-prove” data that
had already been established by brand-name companies.37
Furthermore, generic drug companies could not perform any tests on
a patented drug until after the relevant patent(s) expired, because
such use could be deemed an act of infringement.38
These
impediments delayed generic entry and prolonged consumers’
burden.
The Hatch-Waxman Act addressed these problems in various
ways. First, it provided patent term extension for patents covering a
new drug product subject to FDA regulatory delays.39 Second, the Act
also freed generic manufacturers from patent infringement liability
arising from activities in connection with development of generic
drugs.40 Third, it simplified the application process for generic
manufacturers by allowing the submission of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).41
An ANDA obviates the need for generic companies to obtain all
the necessary data from scratch. It relies on the scientific findings of
the corresponding NDA to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
35
During the pre-Hatch-Waxman era, a patent term was the greater of twenty
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United
States, or seventeen years from the patent grant. See MPEP § 2701 (9th ed. Nov. 2015).
36
The FDA approval process normally takes place after patent acquisition.
Williams, supra note 34, at 3 n.9 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 4 (2002) (“[T]he effective terms of many
patents were shortened due to the time required for the FDA to ensure the safety and
efficacy of the brand-name company’s drug product.”)).
37
Id. at 2 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688 (commenting on the state of the law before the enactment of
the Hatch-Waxman Act that “with respect to drugs approved after 1962, the FDA has
adopted the view that generics must virtually duplicate the same health and safety tests
conducted by the original applicant for marketing approval”)).
38
See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860–61 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984) (holding that the district court erred when it
concluded that the generic company’s use of the patented compound for commercial
development purposes was not infringement even if it was necessary to obtain FDA
approval), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
39
35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(A) (2011).
40
Id. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”).
41
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2010).
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proposed generic drug as long as the generic company shows that its
drug is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug in the NDA.42 An NDA
filer, a brand-name company, may list any patents that it believes to
cover its drug in the FDA’s compendium called Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known
as the “Orange Book.”43 A generic manufacturer seeking FDA approval
must include in its ANDA one of the following certifications with
respect to each patent listed in the Orange Book: no patent is listed in
the Orange Book (Paragraph I); the patent has expired (Paragraph
II); the ANDA filer will not sell the proposed generic drug until the
Orange Book patent expires (Paragraph III); and the patent listed in
the Orange Book is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the generic company’s proposed drug (Paragraph IV).44
A generic applicant must notify the brand-name company if its ANDA
contains a Paragraph IV certification (“Paragraph IV ANDA”).45 Upon
receipt of the notice, the brand-name company may do nothing, in
which case the FDA may authorize the generic company to market its
proposed product.46 Alternatively, the brand-name company may sue
the generic manufacturer because the filing of a Paragraph IV ANDA
itself is considered a statutory act of patent infringement.47 If the
brand-name company sues within forty-five days of notice, the FDA may
not grant final approval of the ANDA until the earlier of the passage
of thirty months or the issuance of a court decision that the patent is
invalid or not infringed.48 Thus, “the mere filing of an infringement . . .
can provide additional years of a generic-free market, regardless of the
merits of the lawsuit.”49 One commentator observed that at least twelve
brand-name companies have actively used their secondary patents to
trigger such thirty-month stay of FDA approval.50
For the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer (“first-filer”), the HatchWaxman Act grants a 180-day exclusivity period, during which other
42

Id.
§ 355(b)(1)(G). Eligible patents issued after the FDA approves an NDA may be
listed in the Orange Book if the manufacturer files the patent information within thirty
days of issuance. § 355(c)(2).
44
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
45
§ 355(j)(2)(B).
46
§ 355(j)(5)(B).
47
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)–(2).
48
§ 355(j)(5)(B).
49
Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug
Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J.
LEGIS. 21, 26–27 (2002).
50
Id. at 34.
43
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generic companies cannot compete in the market.51 The drafters of
the Hatch-Waxman Act may have envisioned this exclusivity period as
a reward for the generic manufacturers who undertake the effort to
invalidate weak patents.52 Ironically, this well-intended incentive has
turned into a “‘bounty’ worth hundreds of millions of dollars for a
major drug” due to its potential to keep the drug prices substantially
high.53 Until 1998, the FDA required the first-filers to win the patent
infringement lawsuit to retain their exclusivity.54 Since then, however,
the FDA relaxed the requirement to allow the first-filers to retain
exclusivity so long as they did not lose.55 This meant that settling a case
did not affect the first-filer’s exclusivity right even if the merits of the
case remained unresolved.
From a brand-name company’s perspective, paying the first-filer
to delay its market entry makes economic sense. First, the first-filer’s
victory leads to a substantial loss of profits, especially in a situation
where the patent at issue is the only patent blocking competition.56
Outcomes of drug patent infringement suits are notoriously
unpredictable and error prone, with patents being invalidated “more
than 70 percent of the time.”57 “This means that the strongest of
patents has a substantial chance of losing after a trial and appeal, just
as the weakest of patents has a substantial chance of winning.”58
Furthermore, brand-name companies have little to gain from their
own victories because they neither result in damages nor prevent other
51

§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). If multiple applicants file on the same day, the FDA may
designate more than one applicant as a “first-filer.” CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY
EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY 5–6 (2003),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm072851.pdf.
52
Schmitt, supra note 28, at 499 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop.
Owners Ass’n in Support of Respondents at 25, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013) (No. 12-416)).
53
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560 (2006).
54
Hemphill, supra note 14, at 658.
55
Id.
56
Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1788, 1800–01 (2011).
57
Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Competition Question Unasked in Actavis: What is the Scope
of the Patent Right to Exclude?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 45, 49,
http://awa2014.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/fall13-peritzc.pdf.
58
Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n in Support of
Respondents at 10, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL
871961, at *10.
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generic companies from attempting to enter the market.59 Rather than
putting their valuable patents in jeopardy and running the risk of
incurring losses, many brand-name companies prefer to settle by
sharing their monopoly profits with first-filers.
More significantly, a settlement that delays a first-filer’s market
entry creates a “bottleneck” period during which a brand-name
company is able to engage in supracompetitive pricing of its drug. This
is because a first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period begins to run only
when the first-filer begins marketing its generic product, or a court
renders a judgment of patent invalidity or non-infringement.60 Thus,
subsequent ANDA filers cannot enter the market unless one of them
obtains a favorable court judgment against the brand-name company.
Brand-name companies avoid the risk of losing altogether by not suing
subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers.61 The ANDA filers have little
incentive to initiate a declaratory judgment action,62 because even the
winner in such a lawsuit must wait for the first-filer’s exclusivity period
to run its course, at which time other generics can enter the market
and drive down the drug prices.63
Congress attempted to rectify the bottleneck problem by adding
a forfeiture provision64 as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).65 The
provision causes a first-filer to lose its exclusivity period when it fails to
market its generic drug by the “later of” the two conditions defined in
subsections (aa) and (bb) of the Act.66 Unfortunately, the problem of
the bottleneck lingers after the MMA amendments because the new

59

See Herman, supra note 56, at 1800.
Hemphill, supra note 14, at 658.
61
Id. at 658–59.
62
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D) (2010) (establishing that generic drug applicant may
file a declaratory judgment action if the NDA holder does not sue on all of the Orange
Book listed patents within the forty-five-day period).
63
Hemphill, supra note 14, at 635.
64
§ 355(j)(5)(D).
65
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
66
The first condition under (aa) is “the earlier of” seventy-five days after the first
filer’s approval is made effective or thirty months after the ANDA filing. §
355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa). The second condition under (bb) is seventy-five days after: a
court decision, from which no appeal has been taken or can be taken, that the patent
is invalid or not infringed; a settlement states that the patent is invalid or not infringed;
the patent information for the listed drug is withdrawn by the NDA holder; or the first
ANDA filer amends or withdraws the Paragraph IV certification. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)
(I)(bb), (q)(1)(G). See also Hemphill, supra note 14, at 660–61.
60
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rule still allows first-filers to retain their exclusivity by settling.67
Furthermore, while the new rule continues to allow subsequent filers
to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period by obtaining a court judgment,
it now requires that the judgment come from an appeals court.68 Thus,
incentives for subsequent filers to challenge patents are further
diminished because even after expending their resources to win at the
appellate level, the 180-day exclusivity remains with the first-filer.69 No
subsequent ANDA filer is eligible for exclusivity upon the first-filer’s
forfeiture.70
Furthermore, the unique framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act
created an inherent power imbalance between brand-name and
generic companies. This is because a Paragraph IV litigation occurs
before the generic enters the market.71 Under such circumstance,
“[t]he patent owner [i.e., the brand-name company] risks losing its
patent, but the alleged infringer does not risk a damage award.”72
From the generic’s perspective, the benefit of winning a lawsuit and
gaining entry to a lucrative market far outweighs the cost of litigation,
and thus justifies a challenge to the patent even with a 1.3% chance of
success.73
The power imbalance may also affect settlement
67

According to the FDA, as long as there is a possibility that at least one of the
conditions in subsection (bb) could still occur, the first-filer would not forfeit its
exclusivity. Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Food & Drug
Admin., to Marc A. Goshko, Exec. Dir., Teva N. Am. 5 (Jan. 17, 2008),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsar
eDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationA
NDAGenerics/UCM151237.pdf [hereinafter FDA Letter]; see also Kurt R. Karst,
Academics Criticize the MMA’s Failure-to-Market Forfeiture Provisions as an Anemic Mechanism
for Parked Exclusivity and the MMA’s DJ Provisions as a Paper Tiger, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr.
27, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/04/
academics-criticize-the-mmas-failure-to-market-forfeiture-provisions-as-an-anemicmechanism-for-park.html (explaining that the current statute does not counteract the
problem of exclusivity “parking” by first ANDA filers).
68
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb); see also Hemphill, supra note 14, at 661 (“The postMMA rules make the relevant condition for defeasement an appeals court win, rather
than a district court win—a condition now applicable to both post-MMA and pre-MMA
drugs.”).
69
Hemphill, supra note 53, at 1586 (noting that settling with a first-filer “removes
from consideration the most motivated challenger, and the one closest to introducing
competition”).
70
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(iii); see also Hemphill, supra note 53, at 1583–84.
71
§ 355(j)(2)(B).
72
David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1307 (2010).
73
Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n in Support of
Respondents, supra note 58, at 24 (“[F]or more than 90% of branded drug sales
(measured in dollars), a generic challenger balancing upside gain under Hatch-
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negotiations. The generic company, knowing that it has little to lose
by litigating, may demand a high settlement amount, and the brandname company would pay that amount as long as it does not exceed
the brand-name company’s expected payout from winning the
lawsuit.74 According to one study, brand-name companies can pay
generic manufacturers between $1.75 million and $132.5 million for a
delay period of between four months and ten years.75 As explained
below, Actavis provides slight leverage in negotiations for brand-name
companies because “unexplained” and “large” reverse payments raise
red flags, but the basic power balance has not changed.
C. Antitrust Enforcement
Even after a settlement is reached, the brand-name and generic
companies do not live happily ever after. Under the current antitrust
enforcement mechanism, parties who have settled a Paragraph IV
litigation could face multiple lawsuits instituted by outside parties. The
enforcement system is decentralized in the United States, and thus,
potential antitrust plaintiffs include the federal government, state
governments, and aggrieved individuals and entities. A federal
antitrust action may be brought under two federal statutes: the
Sherman Act76 and the Clayton Act.77 The FTC78 may initiate an
antitrust action under the Sherman Act against parties for collusion (§
Waxman against downside risk limited to litigation costs can justify the challenge if it
believes it has at least a 1.3% chance of success.”).
74
Amanda P. Reeves, Muddying the Settlement Waters: Open Questions and Unintended
Consequences Following FTC v. Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 9, 12.
75
John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of
Intellectual Property & Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason, 11 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 1, 14 (2006).
76
Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7
(2012)).
77
Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12–27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)). This Comment assumes that the
interstate commerce requirement of the federal statutes is satisfied.
78
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the FTC share the
responsibility of enforcing federal antitrust laws, but only the Antitrust Division may
institute criminal proceedings. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). Criminal prosecutions,
however, are relatively rare in the Hatch-Waxman context because “criminal
prosecution in general and imprisonment in particular have been confined to
instances of outrageous conduct of undoubted illegality.” Molly Wilcox & Jason Yan,
Antitrust Violations, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 837, 838 n.8 (2014) (quoting 2 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTIRUST LAW § 303b (3d ed. 2006)). Hatch-Waxman
settlements do not normally fall within the category of “undoubted illegality” because
the issue of patent validity/infringement creates uncertainty as to the legality of the
settlements.
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1)79 or against a single party for engaging in a monopoly (§ 2).80 15
U.S.C. § 15c also allows state attorneys general to bring civil actions as
parens patriae on behalf of natural persons who have been injured as a
result of a violation of the Sherman Act.81 The Clayton Act authorizes
private individuals who have been injured “by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws” to sue and recover threefold the
damages, as well as the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney’s fee.82
Under federal law, a civil antitrust suit must be commenced within
four years of accrual.83 “An antitrust cause of action accrues . . . when
a defendant commits an act[] that causes injury to the plaintiff.”84 In
the Hatch-Waxman context, this means that the statute of limitations
begins to run when settling parties enter into an allegedly unlawful
agreement. The statute of limitations, however, is not rigid. In class
action lawsuits (which is often the case for private antitrust actions
against parties to Paragraph IV settlements), “the filing of a class action
tolls the statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class.”85
The statute of limitations remains tolled for all members of the
putative class until class certification is denied. Potential class
members “may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs
in the pending action.”86 Therefore, parties to Paragraph IV
settlements may face antitrust lawsuits from both the FTC and private
parties more than four years after the agreement date.
The settling parties could also face state antitrust actions more
than four years after they settle. Nearly all states have antitrust laws
that typically authorize the state attorneys general to bring criminal or
civil actions against antitrust offenders,87 and many state laws provide
remedies for private plaintiffs.88 State statutes of limitations vary, but
some states hold that the limitations period begins when the plaintiff
79

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2011).
Id. § 2.
81
Id. § 15c.
82
Id. § 15a. This right of action is generally limited to direct purchasers of pricefixed items, i.e., persons or entities who directly purchase from the antitrust violator.
See also notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
83
Id. § 15b.
84
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 218
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 338
(1971)).
85
In re Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983).
87
Wilcox et al., supra note 78, at 869.
88
Kurtis A. Kemper, Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on
State Antitrust Claim, 35 A.L.R. 6TH 245, pt. II.B.§ 9 (2008).
80
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discovers the anticompetitive act as opposed to when the defendants
settle. For example, in Rhode Island, the plaintiff must commence an
action “within four (4) years after the plaintiff discovered, or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts
relied upon for proof of the conspiracy.”89
For many injured parties (such as consumers who bought
overpriced drugs), one significant hurdle is antitrust standing.
Paragraph IV settlements affect people’s right to healthcare,90 yet not
every injured person is entitled to recovery even when the federal and
state statutes provide private causes of action.91 Specifically, the
indirect purchaser rule limits recovery only to direct purchasers, i.e.,
persons or entities who purchased price-fixed items directly from the
antitrust violator.92 This rule applies to the federal statutes93 as well as
many state statutes that do not specifically repeal the indirect
purchaser rule.94 In the pharmaceutical context, indirect purchasers
(e.g., consumers) are precluded from bringing an antitrust action
against those companies that caused delayed generic entry by way of a
settlement agreement.95 Thus, indirect purchasers of pharmaceutical
89

R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-23 (2014); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:9-14 (West 2014)
(“Any action brought to enforce the provisions of this act shall be barred unless
commenced within 4 years after the cause of action arose . . . .”).
90
See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H12,623, H12,848 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement
of Rep. Braley) (“[T]his bill will do for America what we should have done 100 years
ago: provide health care for all Americans as a matter of right, not as a matter of
privilege.”); 155 CONG. REC. H12,598, H12,619 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Langevin) (“Every American deserves the promise of quality affordable health
care, and this is our moment to fulfill that promise.”). This Comment refrains from
discussing the issue of whether illegal immigrants have the right to healthcare.
91
For example, Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action,
authorizing a person injured “by reason of” an allegedly anticompetitive act to sue and
recover threefold the damages, as well as the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney’s
fee. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2011). Many state laws also provide similar remedies for private
plaintiffs. See Kemper, supra note 88, at pt. II.B.§ 9.
92
See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See also Kemper,
supra note 88, at pt. I.§ 2 (explaining that the indirect purchaser rule “generally bars
actions by retail buyers against manufacturers of price-fixed products, subject to
limited exceptions”).
93
See, e.g., In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
1369 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has flatly repudiated such efforts to
trace damages through multiple levels in a chain of distribution or to apportion
damages between direct and indirect purchasers.”).
94
See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 409
(D. Mass. 2013) (“[E]nd-payors cannot assert antitrust claims under the law of states
which have not passed [repealer statutes which specifically grant end-payors the right
to sue for antitrust violations].”).
95
Some exceptions apply. For example, in In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 368, 370 (D. Mass. 2004), retail drug store plaintiffs were allowed
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drugs often have no practical avenue to recover damages for overpaid
drug products. Even in the states that recently enacted the so-called
“repealer” statutes of the indirect purchaser rule (also called “Illinois
Brick repealers”), the statutes often apply prospectively.96 Indirect
purchasers in such jurisdictions cannot recover for the overcharges
that took place before the enactment of the repealer statutes. In
recent years, indirect purchasers have attempted to circumvent this
rule by making claims under the state consumer protection statutes
and unjust enrichment laws, but their attempts have typically been
unsuccessful. For instance, consumer protection statutes have
requirements that cannot be easily satisfied since they apply only to
courses of conduct that are deceptive and fraudulent as opposed to
merely anticompetitive.97 Many courts have also dismissed unjust
enrichment claims brought under state laws because they would
otherwise constitute “end-runs” around state antitrust laws and
consumer-protection statutes.98
Even in states that permit indirect purchasers to bring an antitrust
claim, there is the fundamental problem of accessing private
settlement agreements. This problem also plagues direct purchasers.
As time passes, it would become an increasingly daunting task for
anyone to identify any side deals related to the settlement. In In re
Lipitor, for example, it was not until after limited discovery that all
relevant side agreements were revealed: multiple litigations
concerning two other drugs in the United States—Accupril and
Caduet—as well as twenty-three legal proceedings in thirteen foreign
countries.99 In light of Actavis, settlements of Paragraph IV lawsuits will
likely become more complex to avoid an appearance of a large,
unexplained reverse payment.100 Individuals who were involved in
recovery for their federal claims even though they were indirect purchasers because
they had been expressly assigned the rights of direct purchasers that had opted out of
the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ class.
96
In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 759 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[T]he
end-payor plaintiffs may not recover for any overcharges incurred before the Oregon
and Rhode Island repealer statutes took effect.”).
97
See, e.g., id. The case was an antitrust suit in connection with a reverse payment
settlement. Claims brought under the consumer protection statutes of Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia were dismissed because no allegations of deceit were made.
Id. at 760.
98
See, e.g., In re Terazosin, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1380 (“State legislatures and courts
that adopted the Illinois Brick rule against indirect purchaser antitrust suits did not
intend to allow an end run around the policies allowing only direct purchasers to
recover.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 532–34 (D.N.J. 2014).
100
See Reeves, supra note 74, at 12 (“To eliminate as much risk [of antitrust lawsuit]
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settlement negotiations may be unavailable by the time an injured
party contemplates an antitrust action. In some instances, settled
parties voluntarily publish the terms of their settlement agreements.101
Nevertheless, “publicly available information contains significant
gaps”102 and may be insufficient for private parties to plead a cause of
action that can survive a motion to dismiss, or to recognize an
anticompetitive scheme to begin with.
The problem is compounded when a brand-name company
strategically enters into a series of settlement agreements with multiple
ANDA filers.103 Such a scheme is difficult to identify and/or prove.
Suppose a brand-name company has an extremely weak patent that is
blocking competition in a lucrative market. The brand-name company
initiates a patent infringement action against the first-filer and then
settles, requiring the first-filer to delay its market entry and to retain its
180-day exclusivity. This settlement blocks subsequent filers from
entering the market until after the expiration of the agreed-upon delay
period plus 180 days, unless one of the subsequent ANDA filers obtains
an appellate court judgment that the patent is invalid or not
infringed.104 Suppose further that a number of the subsequent filers
decide to challenge the patent. The brand-name company sues and
then settles with each of them in order to prevent a court judgment of
invalidity or non-infringement.
This series of settlements is
anticompetitive because, as described above, a weak patent does not
warrant its owner to exclude others from competition.105 Because of
the complexities and confidential nature of these agreements,

as possible, companies should . . . avoid structuring settlements that involve
unexplained high dollar payments from the branded to the generic company . . . .”).
101
For example, in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp.
2d 188, 197 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), settled parties had made press releases regarding
the settlement and its major terms. Moreover, one of the parties submitted a redacted
copy of the settlement agreement in a public SEC filing. As another example, if a
generic company challenges a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
information related to the proceeding becomes public.
102
Hemphill, supra note 14, at 647.
103
See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229–30 (2013). FTC filed a lawsuit
against all settling parties alleging that Solvay, the patentee, colluded with both the
first Paragraph IV filer, Actavis, and the subsequent filer, Paddock, to share in Solvay’s
monopoly profits. Id. Solvay agreed to pay the two filers in exchange for delaying
market entry. Id. at 2229.
104
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2010); Hemphill, supra note 14, at 658. See also
FDA Letter, supra note 67.
105
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“[A]n invalidated patent carries with it no . . . right
[to exclude others from competition]. And even a valid patent confers no right to
exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe.”).
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however, antitrust plaintiffs might not be able to identify and attack all
such agreements. Thus, a brand-name company might prevail on the
individual actions, even if the settlement scheme as a whole is unlawful.
Since settling parties in Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are required to
submit their agreements to the FTC,106 one might argue that the FTC
is better-positioned than private parties to bring actions on behalf of
the injured members of the public who have no legal recourse. In fact,
after Actavis, the FTC has reaffirmed its plans to focus on pay for delay
settlements.107 But government agencies have limited resources and
cannot satisfy the interests of all individual purchasers. Furthermore,
the political climate could shift an agency’s focus and resources to
another issue at any time. Most significantly, the FTC cannot always be
proactive in its approach to consumer protection. Its enforcement
actions often take place long after consumers have been injured.
D. Actavis and Questions Left Unanswered
i. FTC v. Actavis, Inc.
Actavis revolved around agreements that a single brand-name
company entered into with three generic companies to settle
Paragraph IV litigations. The agreements contained “roughly similar
promises,” requiring each generic company to not enter the relevant
market until sixty-five months before the brand-name company’s
patent expired and to market the brand-name company’s product in
return for the payment of “millions of dollars.”108 The FTC initiated an
antitrust lawsuit against all parties for “unlawfully agreeing to share in
[the brand-name company]’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent
challenges, and refrain from launching [cheaper generic drugs] . . .
for nine years.”109 As mentioned above, the dilemma in antitrust cases
involving reverse payment settlement agreements stems from the
unresolved issue of patent strength. The pre-Actavis courts disagreed
as to the antitrust standard for analyzing reverse payment settlements.
Some circuits applied the “scope-of-the-patent” test, under which a
106

MMA, supra note 13.
See José P. Sierra, FTC Reveals Plans for Reverse Payment Hatch-Waxman Cases,
PHARMARISC.COM (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.pharmarisc.com/2013/08/ftc-revealsplans-for-reverse-payment-hatch-waxman-cases/ (“Ending anti-competitive ‘pay-fordelay’ settlements is a top priority at the Federal Trade Commission, according to FTC
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez.”). See also Wright, supra note 3 (interpreting the Actavis
decision to be a “significant victory for the Commission”).
108
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
109
Id. at 2229–30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107
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reverse payment settlement was immune from antitrust scrutiny so
long as the anticompetitive effects fell within the “exclusionary
potential” of the patent.110 Other courts employed the “quick-look”
approach, which viewed reverse payment settlements as prima facie
evidence of illegality.111
The Actavis Court resolved the circuit split by holding that courts
should employ the rule of reason approach112 to strike a balance
“between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the
illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.”113 In
connection with the rule of reason analysis, the Court suggested that
“the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable
surrogate for a patent’s weakness,”114 which in turn reveals “the
payment’s objective . . . to maintain supracompetitive prices to be
shared among the patentee and the challenger.”115 The Court further
stated that the size of a reverse payment may serve as “a strong
indicator of power” possessed by the patentee to bring about
anticompetitive harm.116 The Court rejected the “scope-of-the-patent”
analysis because “whether a particular restraint lies beyond the limits
of the patent monopoly is a conclusion . . . and not . . . its starting
point.”117 The Court pointed out that the “scope-of-the-patent” test
overlooks the possibility of the patentee’s “serious doubts about the
patent’s survival” and objective of the payment “to maintain
supracompetitive prices.”118 In rejecting the “quick look” approach,
the Court held that some reverse payments can be justified under
antitrust analysis.119

110

See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012).
112
The rule of reason analysis, in general, examines “whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
113
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114
Id. at 2236–37.
115
Id. at 2236.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 2231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
118
Id. at 2235, 2236–37.
119
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
111
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ii. The Aftermath of Actavis
While Actavis resolved the circuit split, it left more questions than
answers because the Court left “to the lower courts the structuring of
the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”120 One unresolved issue
in the aftermath of Actavis is the precise definition of the term
“payment.” There are currently various ways to settle Hatch-Waxman
disputes other than what was at issue in Actavis. For example,
settlements can take the form of a licensing agreement without any
money exchanging hands where the brand-name company allows the
generic manufacturer to use its patent.121 Since the issuance of the
Actavis opinion in June 2013, lower courts have already disagreed on
what constitutes “payment.” Some judges have held that the Actavis
decision applies to monetary payments only, while others concluded
that payment is not so limited.122 The FTC agrees with the latter view,
noting that a brand-name company’s promise not to develop or market
its authorized generic (AG)123 is a form of payment.124
Furthermore, the Actavis Court did not define what constitutes a
“large” payment. The Court only suggested that “strong evidence” of
anticompetitive activity may be found when the amount of payment is
120

Id. at 2238. See In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 235 (D. Conn.
2015) (“Several district courts have already applied Actavis, with not entirely consistent
results.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121
Fazzio, supra note 75, at 13–14.
122
Compare, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 192 (D.R.I.
2014) (“Reading Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to
monetary settlements . . . .”), with King Drug Co. of Florence v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We do not believe Actavis’s holding can be
limited to reverse payments of cash.”), In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., 42
F. Supp. 3d 231, 262 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[U]nlawful reverse payments are not limited to
monetary payments.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), In re Lipitor Antitrust
Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 543 (D.N.J. 2014) (“In applying Actavis here, the nonmonetary payment must be converted to a reliable estimate of its monetary
value . . . .”), and In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(“‘[R]everse payment’ is not limited to a cash payment.”).
123
An AG is a generic drug produced by the same brand-name company that issues
the corresponding brand-name drug. Brand-name companies can market AGs even
during the first-filer’s exclusivity period. See, e.g., Alix McKenna, FTC Report Shows
Increase in Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements, REGBLOG (June 11, 2013),
http://www.regblog.org/2013/06/11/11-mckenna-ftc-report/.
124
Brief of Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 16–18, King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d
388 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1243), 2014 WL 1745072, at *16–18 (urging the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit to reverse the district court’s determination that a
brand-name company’s commitment not to introduce an authorized generic in
exchange for a generic company’s promise to drop a challenge to the patent was not
a “reverse-payment” under Actavis).
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larger than what the generic drug would gain in profits if it won the
Paragraph IV litigation and entered the market.125 At the same time,
the Court cautioned that a finding of large reverse payment alone is
insufficient to conclude illegality because certain reverse payments can
have lawful explanations, such as the cost of anticipated litigation,
payments for valuable services promised to be rendered by the generic
company, or “any other convincing justification.”126
Yet another uncertainty arising from Actavis is when and how the
question of patent validity and/or infringement should be considered.
According to the Court, “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent
validity to answer the antitrust question,”127 and the legal community is
largely in agreement that the Actavis Court did not wish to entirely
disregard the merits of a settled case.128 A challenge lies in defining
the conditions under which the issue of patent validity and
infringement must be addressed. Furthermore, in cases where the
merits of underlying litigation may not be considered, it is
questionable whether antitrust principles alone are sufficient to assess
the anticompetitive effects of Paragraph IV settlements. As one
commentator points out, “the problem is that the ultimate competitive
impact of a pharmaceutical patent settlement is really dependent on
the merits of the underlying patent litigation.”129

125

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Hemphill, supra note 53, at 1581).
Id. at 2237.
127
Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).
128
See, e.g., FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 527, 531–32 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(“[I]n my view, the use of the word ‘normally’ reflects the Court’s expression that
under certain discrete circumstances there could be situations where the validity of
the patent should be litigated within a reverse payment antitrust trial.”); Taavola, supra
note 9, at 1406 (“[T]he rule-of-reason approach may encourage the parties, at least in
part, to argue the merits of the underlying case.”). See also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238
(suggesting that courts structure litigation to avoid both “the use of antitrust theories
too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and . . . consideration of every possible fact
or theory”).
129
McDonald, supra note 9, at 38 (quoting Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Address Before the Am. Bar Ass’n Antitrust Healthcare Program: Antitrust
Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Pt. II (May 17, 2001),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2001/05/antitrust-issues-settlementpharmaceutical-patent-disputes-part-ii#N_6_).
126
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III. DETAILS AND ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL APPROVAL
PROCEDURE
Bearing in mind the intricate interrelationships among the
Hatch-Waxman Act, antitrust laws, and the public interests, this
Comment suggests that Congress implement a mandatory procedure
to judicially approve settlement agreements (“proposed procedure” or
“proposed settlement procedure”) that alleviates many of the
problems associated with settling Paragraph IV litigations and similar
proceedings.130 The procedure mirrors the framework of Rule 23(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires judicial
approval of any “settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the
claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class” in a class action.131
Perhaps the initial reaction to applying Rule 23(e) in this context
may be that Paragraph IV litigations are not class actions. When parties
to a Paragraph IV litigation settle, non-parties (e.g., members of the
public) will not be legally bound by the settlement terms in the same
way that class members would be bound in a class action settlement.
While this is true and could be a potential limitation to applying Rule
23(e), common law sometimes calls for judicial review and approval,
particularly if a settlement “affects the rights of non-parties or nonsettling parties, or where the settlement is executed by a party acting
in a representative capacity.”132
Addressing the second condition first, one could argue that
Paragraph IV filers act for the benefit of the public by virtue of
challenging unwarranted patents.133 In case of Paragraph IV litigations
involving weak patents, it is overwhelmingly pro-competitive and
beneficial to the public when a Paragraph IV filer prevails. But
Paragraph IV filers fall short of playing the “representative” role on
behalf of the public: the interests of Paragraph IV filers and the public
do not align, because the ultimate goal of Paragraph IV filers in

130

The proposed procedure focuses on the settlements of actions that were
initiated within forty-five days of Paragraph IV notice. The same model, however, may
apply to settlements of other types of actions. For example, brand-name companies
may strategically choose to initiate a lawsuit based on Paragraph IV filings after the
expiration of forty-five days or wait for the Paragraph IV filer to file a declaratory
judgment action against them. The same anticompetitive concerns discussed in this
Comment would apply to settlements of such actions because they can involve a
payment, delayed generic entry, and retention of the 180-day exclusivity period.
131
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
132
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.14 at 172 (2004) [hereinafter
MANUAL].
133
Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1338.
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litigation is not necessarily “victory,” i.e., invalidating the patent or
finding a non-infringement.134 When a Paragraph IV filer prevails in
litigation and enters the market, it is often true that “the total profits of
the patent holder and the generic manufacturer on the drug in the
competitive market will be lower than the total profits of the patent
holder alone under a patent-conferred monopoly.”135 Therefore, it
makes economic sense for a Paragraph IV filer to settle by delaying its
market entry and reap the benefit of the resulting monopoly of the
patent holder as long as the value of the filer’s share exceeds the
anticipated gain from litigious victory. A Paragraph IV filer certainly is
not acting in a “representative capacity” when it settles an action
involving a weak patent because the public is denied access to generic
drugs. Furthermore, the existence of a weak patent influences drug
availability to the public in the future because a bad patent often causes
other companies to forgo R&D in the field it improperly covers.136
Reduced participation in R&D hampers innovation and results in
fewer treatment options for patients.
The first condition—settlements affecting the rights of nonparties or non-settling parties—better describes Paragraph IV
settlements because the Hatch-Waxman procedural framework
facilitates “litigation specifically intended to benefit parties beyond
those named in the action.”137 The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to “assure
that any person whose rights would be affected by a dismissal or
compromise has the opportunity to contest the proposed action.”138
Similarly, the outcome of a Paragraph IV litigation affects accessibility
of drugs for patients who have the right to healthcare.139 Today,
patients on at least one prescription drug make up anywhere from 50%
134

Robert E. Colletti, The Role of the Food and Drug Attorney in Hatch-Waxman
Lawsuits, Food and Drug Settlements and Negotiations, in INSIDE THE MINDS: FOOD AND DRUG
SETTLEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS (2006) (discussing various ways in which generic
companies benefit from filing an ANDA regardless of first-to-file status).
135
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006),
abrogated on other grounds by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
136
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION
AND
PATENT
LAW
AND
POLICY
1,
5
(2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovationproper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
137
Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1338.
138
Pearson v. Skydell, 522 F.2d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted), reh’g denied, 525 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976); see also Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The purpose of requiring Court approval of a ‘dismissal’ or
‘compromise’ of a class action is to protect the interests of non-party class members.”).
139
See supra note 90.
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to 70% of the population.140 The FTC estimates that pay for delay
settlements add $35 billion to consumers’ out-of-pocket expenses and
$12 billion or more to the federal government over a ten year period.141
In 2013, 21% of adults in the United States discontinued or skipped
prescription doses because of high cost.142
Furthermore, the current regulatory climate does not necessarily
“induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments
necessary to research and develop new drug products while
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies
of those drugs to market.”143 As with any for-profit enterprise, a brandname company’s decision to invest in research is driven by economic
factors. Because pharmaceutical companies can spend up to $5 billion
to develop a single drug,144 each drug that enters the market must
generate enough profit to exceed these costs. R&D costs, however, are
not the only financial concerns related to product development.145 A
140

Wenjun Zhong et al., Age and Sex Patterns of Drug Prescribing in a Defined American
Population,
MAYO
CLINIC
PROC.,
July
2013,
at
699,
http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(13)00357-1/pdf;
Qiuping Gu et al., Prescription Drug Use Continues to Increase: U.S. Prescription Drug Data
for
20072008,
NCHS
Data
Brief
No.
42,
Sept.
2010,
at
6,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf.
141
Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Center for
American Progress: “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How
Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help
Pay for Healthcare Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) (June 23, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/pay-delaysettlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conductprotect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
142
Paris, supra note 5 (noting findings in the 2013 Commonwealth Fund
International Health Policy Survey).
143
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting
aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)).
144
Herper, supra note 20.
145
Brand-name companies are subject to additional financial strains. For example,
since 2011, Section 9008 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) “has
imposed an annual fee on manufacturers and importers of ‘branded prescription
drugs,’” but “generic drugs approved under ANDAs are not subject to the fee.” Alan
M. Kirschenbaum, Final Rule on Branded Rx Drug Fee Treats All NDAs the Same, but IRS
Might Consider a Special Rule for Pre-Hatch-Waxman Paper NDAs, FDA LAW BLOG (Aug. 24,
2014, 1:20 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_
phelps/2014/08/final-rule-on-branded-rx-drug-fee-treats-all-ndas-the-same-but-irsmight-consider-a-special-rule-for.html. FDA may require Risk Evaluation Mitigation
Strategies (REMS) “as part of the approval of a new product, or . . . when new safety
information arises,” which cause brand-name companies to incur additional costs.
FDA Basics Webinar: A Brief Overview of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS),
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/
ucm325201.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2016); see 21 U.S.C. § 355(p) (2010). Furthermore,
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brand-name company may also take into account the likelihood of
generics’ market entry,146 the cost of future litigations (including
potential antitrust litigations), and the probability of successful
settlement(s).147 If the occurrence of future antitrust litigation is so
unpredictable, companies might overestimate the associated costs and
shy away from particular research projects altogether. Even if a brandname company decides to engage in R&D, uncertainty as to the
antitrust legality of settlements may still cause the brand-name
company to inflate its non-R&D costs. This overestimation is justifiable
since the FTC interprets the Actavis decision to be a “significant victory
for the Commission.”148 Therefore, brand-name companies will likely
factor in expected costs of antitrust litigations when determining drug
prices, effectively shifting the costs to consumers.149 Considering the
profound impacts of pharmaceutical litigations on public health and
expenses, members of the public affected by Paragraph IV litigations
can be said to be analogous to class members in class action lawsuits
who are bound by the terms of settlements.
The requirement of judicial approval is not an entirely new
concept. Professor C. Scott Hemphill has suggested using Rule 23(e)
settlement procedure as a model to settle Paragraph IV litigations, but
without exploring the topic in detail.150 Outside the Hatch-Waxman
regime, the concept of judicial approval has been utilized in various
contexts to protect defined members of the population. For example,
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1(c) requires a directive similar
to Rule 23(e) approval process to “settle[], voluntarily dismiss[], or
compromise[]” a shareholder derivative action.151 The purpose of such
a requirement is “to safeguard the interests of shareholders not directly
involved in the action.”152 Another example is New York State’s Not-

the ACA provisions mandate drug manufacturers to provide a 50% discount to
Medicare Part D beneficiaries for brand-name drugs and biologics purchased during
the coverage gap of Part D. BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 781 (7th ed. 2013). Section 2501 of the ACA also increases the rebates
that must be paid by drug manufacturers for pharmaceuticals covered by Medicaid.
Id. at 856.
146
Murat C. Mungan, Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
39 (2013).
147
Id.
148
Wright, supra note 3.
149
Pamela J. Clements, The Hatch-Waxman Act and the Conflict Between Antitrust Law
& Patent Law, 48 IDEA 381, 401 (2008).
150
See Hemphill, supra note 14, at 640.
151
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c).
152
Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974).
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for-Profit Corporation Law, which requires a judicial approval
proceeding before a charitable corporation can dispose of its assets.153
With the state attorney general serving as a statutory party to the
proceeding, the purpose of the New York statute is to “ensure that the
interests of the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation, the public,
are adequately represented and protected from improvident
transactions.”154 Some may argue that a judicial approval requirement
undermines the general policy favoring private settlements of
expensive and time-consuming patent litigations. The Supreme Court,
however, cautioned against acceding to practical concerns when there
is “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”155 Within the
Hatch-Waxman regime, the public interest to balance innovation and
competition far outweighs the need to settle in private.
Moreover, there is some indication that sufficient judicial
intervention in a Paragraph IV settlement may lead a court to conclude
that the agreement is justified. In In re Effexor Antitrust Litigation, the
District Court of New Jersey held that the payment arrangement as
stipulated in the settlement agreement does not raise anticompetitive
concerns because the judge who entered a consent decree
incorporating the settlement agreement did so after soliciting the
FTC’s view on antitrust issues concerning the agreement, and the FTC
decided not to object within the prescribed period.156 Courts are
generally in consensus that “private settlement agreements entered
into during the pendency of litigation that are neither presented to
nor approved by the judge presiding over the dispute fall outside the
ambit of [antitrust] immunity.”157 Nonetheless, it is doubtful that any

153

N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511 (McKinney 2014).
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 592 (1999).
155
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013) (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed’n
of Dentists, 474 U.S. 447, 460–61 (2009)).
156
In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479 (PGS) (LHG), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 142206, at *37–41, *76–78 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014). Note, however, that the
opinion does not specifically address the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and the decision
is based on fact-specific analysis.
157
In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 395 (D. Mass.
2013) (citing Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 818–19 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 634–36 (E.D.
Mich. 2000)). The antitrust immunity being referred to here is called the NoerrPennington doctrine, which “grants antitrust immunity to persons and organizations
who, with the intent to restrain trade and diminish competition, act in concert to
petition the government to adopt laws and implement policies that are anticompetitive
in nature.” Id. at 394 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 499 (1988)).
154
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consent judgment is per se immune from antitrust scrutiny.158 In In re
Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, the immunity defense was
unsuccessful because “it [was] unclear whether the judge could be
fairly said to have endorsed the terms of the settlement agreements.”159
Given the current legal climate, if a reliable procedure is available to
judicially approve settlement agreements, courts would be willing to
confer immunity to the agreements and thus, the procedure would
help to curtail complex and expensive antitrust litigations in the
future.
The following subsections describe the proposed procedure.
Subsection A sets the ground rules for settling parties that would be
applicable throughout the proposed procedure. The proposed
procedure consists of two phases: Subsection B discusses the initial
evaluation phase; and Subsection C describes the formal hearing phase
that enables members of the public to object to questionable
settlement agreements. Subsection D explains the importance of
keeping the proposed procedure on a strict timeline. This Comment
makes no claim that the proposed procedure is ideal, and the
procedure likely requires further adjustments. Nonetheless, short of
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act or antitrust laws, a more
preemptive and drastic approach is necessary.
A. Conditions Imposed on the Settling Parties
This Comment proposes to impose three conditions on parties
who wish to settle. The first two conditions are meant to encourage
the parties to negotiate in good faith and to be applied as soon as the
parties express their intent to settle: (1) the plaintiff (brand-name
company) may dismiss the case only under the condition that it would
not preclude the sale of the product proposed in the defendant’s
ANDA on the basis of the patent at issue; and (2) the defendant may
not convert its Paragraph IV certification to Paragraph III certification.
The third condition requires the parties to disclose to the court all
material information related to the settlement that they are proposing.
The first condition ensures that the plaintiff brand-name
company utilizes the proposed procedure in good faith. As discussed
more in depth below,160 brand-name companies benefit from staying
158

Id. at 395 (“There is little guidance, however, on the question of whether a
judge’s entry of a consent judgment falls squarely within the scope of NoerrPennington.”).
159
Id. at 398.
160
See discussion infra Part III.D.
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Paragraph IV actions. They could abuse the system by filing a
Paragraph IV suit with little prospect of winning, deliberately dragging
out the lawsuit until the end of the thirty-month stay, initiating the
settlement approval process, and finally dismissing the action. The
current statutory provision, 21 U.S.C. § 355, discourages such tactics by
giving the judge a statutory discretion to shorten the thirty-month stay
period when “either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate
in expediting the action.”161 But its deterrent effects are moderate,
because even if the thirty-month stay is lifted, the patent at issue is still
in force. A future lawsuit remains a possibility for the defendant if it
launches its generic product at risk. If the generic company
subsequently files a declaratory action, the legal proceeding would
prolong the period during which the public is deprived of generic
drugs. In a class action, a court approval is required before any
voluntary dismissal.162 The purpose of this requirement “is to protect
the interest of non-party class members.”163 Similarly, the proposed
settlement procedure should take into account the interests of those
in need of generic drugs. Thus, the first condition eliminates
uncertainty as to the legal status of the proposed ANDA product upon
voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff and allows the generic company to
enter the market sooner.
The second condition ensures that the defendant generic
company negotiates in good faith. Since the risks associated with
Paragraph IV challenges are small, a generic company might file a
Paragraph IV ANDA against a strong patent to induce the brand-name
patent holder to sue and see how the settlement negotiation plays out.
If the defendant finds itself in an unfavorable position, it can back out
by converting its ANDA certification from Paragraph IV to III, which
attests that the generic company would refrain from selling the
proposed product until the patent at issue expires.164 This would result
in dismissal of the action.165 Not only is such practice a waste of judicial
161

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2010).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of any “settlement, voluntary
dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class”). But
note, “Rule 23(e) does not require court approval when the parties voluntarily dismiss
class allegations before class certification. However, in certain situations in which a
voluntary dismissal might represent an abuse of the class action process, the court
should inquire into the circumstances behind the dismissal.” MANUAL, supra note 132,
§ 21.61, at 309 n.948.
163
See, e.g., Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Malcolm v. Cities Serv. Co., 2 F.R.D. 405, 406 (D. Del. 1942).
164
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
165
There has been at least one instance where the defendant’s conversion of its
162
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resources, but it also exacerbates the power imbalance166 between the
parties. Therefore, the second condition fosters bona fide challenges
to brand-name patents.
The third condition is the disclosure requirement. Under Rule
23(e), parties who agree to settle must “disclose all terms of the
[proposed] settlement or compromise” to the court presiding over the
class action.167 The parties must also submit to the court “a statement
identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal,”168
including any undertakings “that, although seemingly separate, may
have influenced the terms of the settlement by trading away possible
advantages for the class in return for advantages for others.”169 The
settling parties may supplement the disclosure with briefs, motions, or
informal presentations.170
Similarly, the proposed procedure should require parties to a
Paragraph IV litigation to submit their proposed settlement agreement
to the court in which their case is pending. The proposed agreement
may be in the form of a summary in lieu of a copy of the actual
agreement as long as it sufficiently describes all material terms. The
court should have discretion to direct the settling parties to submit
additional materials that “the court considers relevant to its review of
a proposed settlement.”171 The requested information may include any
factors indicating the value of the settlement, e.g., the cost of litigation
or the total present value of monetary and nonmonetary terms.172 The
ANDA certification has resulted in a court dismissal. See United Therapeutics Corp.
v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 3:12-CV-01617 & 3:13-CV-316, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121573, at
*1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2014), which notes that:
Plaintiff’s complaints also included allegations that [defendant] Sandoz
would infringe [the ‘222] patent listed in the [Orange Book] . . . . On
April 9, 2014, Sandoz converted its paragraph IV certification regarding
the ‘222 patent to a paragraph III certification. On June 2, 2014, in
accordance with that decision, the Court dismissed the counts in
[plaintiff’s] Complaints alleging infringement of the ‘222 patent without
prejudice, along with Sandoz’s counterclaims for non-infringement and
invalidity of the ‘222 patent.
166
See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
167
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s
notes to 2003 Amendment.
168
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
169
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s
notes to 2003 Amendment.
170
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 320–21.
171
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s
notes to 2003 Amendment.
172
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 320. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory
committee’s notes to 2003 Amendment (“Settlements involving nonmonetary
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parties should also be required to disclose any agreement or
undertakings that, “although seemingly separate, may have influenced
the terms of the settlement by trading away”173 potential benefits to the
public.
The disclosure requirement enables individuals or entities that
could be affected by the settlement to view pertinent information and
intervene under certain circumstances before the settlement goes into
effect. The affected parties no longer need to scour through public
records after incurring antitrust injury in hopes of finding useful
information. Furthermore, the disclosure requirement enables a court
to identify any anticompetitive scheme comprising a series of
settlements174 prior to its fruition because the requirement would be
imposed on first-filers and subsequent filers alike. Under Rule 23(e):
[t]he spirit of [the disclosure requirement] is to compel
identification of any agreement or understanding that might
have affected the interests of class members by altering what
they may be receiving or foregoing. Side agreements might
indicate, for example, that the settlement is not reasonable
because they may reveal additional funds that might have
been paid to the class that are instead paid to selected
claimants or their attorneys.175
Likewise, the disclosure requirement in the proposed procedure
forces the settling parties to put all potentially related transactions on
the table, thereby allowing the court to examine the parties’ motives
and see the big picture. If any of the side agreements signal an
anticompetitive concern, the issue can be resolved before an
anticompetitive harm takes place. The disclosure requirement also
spares the settling parties from expensive discovery in antitrust actions
that could take place years after the settlement is entered.
Rule 23(e)(3) does not specify sanction for failure to identify an
agreement or an undertaking connected with the settlement,176 but the
Federal Judicial Center suggests reopening the approved settlement if
the unidentified materials bear significantly on the settlement’s

provisions for class members also deserve careful scrutiny to ensure that these
provisions have actual value to the class.”). If necessary, the court should give the
settling parties an opportunity to claim the protection of attorney-client privilege and
confidentiality. See MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 319.
173
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s
notes to 2003 Amendment.
174
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
175
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 319.
176
Id. § 21.631, at 320.
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reasonableness.177 The proposed procedure should simulate this
sanction by voiding the presumptive legality of an approved agreement
as described below.178
B. Initial Evaluation of a Proposed Paragraph IV Settlement
i. Preliminary Review
Rule 23(e) requires the settling parties to bear the burden of
persuading the court that settlement is preferable to litigation by
showing that their settlement terms are “fair, reasonable, and
adequate.”179 The presiding court preliminarily reviews the proposed
settlement agreement and orders a formal hearing (commonly known
as a “fairness hearing”) only if the court is satisfied with the “fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy” of the settlement terms.180 These
determinations may be made with or without a preliminary hearing,181
and the court may seek an independent review of provisions that call
for closer scrutiny.182 The settling parties have an opportunity to
amend their agreement to overcome the court’s objections.183
In class actions, factors that may be considered by the court in
evaluating a proposed settlement agreement vary depending on the
nature of the suit being settled.184 Some general factors include, but
are not limited to: “advantages of the proposed settlement” as opposed
to proceeding with the litigation in light of the merits of the claims;185
whether any attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are

177

Id.
See infra Parts III.B.ii & III.C.iii.
179
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 318.
180
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 321.
181
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 320–21.
182
Examples of questionable provisions include “unduly preferential treatment of
class representatives or segments of the class, inadequate compensation or harms to
the classes, the need for subclasses, or excessive compensation for attorneys.” Id. §
21.632, at 321.
183
Id.
184
Id. § 21.62, at 315.
185
Id. § 21.62, at 316.
178
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reasonable;186 “the maturity of the underlying substantive issues”;187 “the
extent of participation in the settlement negotiations by class
members” or their representatives, “a judge, a magistrate judge, or a
special master”;188 “the effect of the settlement on other pending
actions”;189 what other courts have done with similar settlements;190 the
amount of a monetary relief provided for class members;191 and the
value of non-monetary relief.192
Furthermore, the judicial role under Rule 23(e) is limited to
approving, disapproving, or imposing conditions on a proposed
settlement.193 In conducting a preliminary review of a class action
settlement, the court must “adopt the role of a skeptical client and
critically examine” the terms of the proposed settlement.194 Some
circuit courts have even stated that “the district court acts as a fiduciary
who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.”195
To this end, Rule 23(e) authorizes the court to appoint a magistrate
judge, guardian ad litem, special master, court-appointed expert, or
technical advisor who assists in reviewing the terms of a proposed
settlement terms, studying how those terms affect the absent class
members, and determining their fairness, reasonableness, and
adequacy.196 A court-appointed expert provides testimony and a
neutral assessment “regarding the valuation of the settlement” or of its

186

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s notes
to 2003 Amendment (“Whether or not there are formal objections, the court must
determine whether a fee award is justified and, if so, set a reasonable fee.”); In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have repeatedly
held that a district court abuses its discretion if it approves a class action settlement
without determining that any attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are
reasonable and that the settlement itself is reasonable in light of those fees.”).
187
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.62, at 316.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. § 21.62, at 317.
191
Id.
192
In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283,
316–24 (3d Cir. 1998).
193
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The settlement
must stand or fall in its entirety.”); but cf. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00CV-0648, 2001 WL 170792, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (conditioning approval of
a settlement on parties’ adopting changes specified by the district court).
194
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.61, at 310.
195
Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975). See also
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Cendant
Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).
196
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 321 & § 21.644, at 329.
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legality.197 The court must determine whether such testimony will
“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact
in issue.”198
Similar to the Rule 23(e) procedure, the settling parties in the
proposed procedure should bear the burden of persuading the court
that their agreement is not unreasonably anticompetitive. The court’s
role should be limited to approving or disapproving a proposed
agreement. The presiding judge may not draft nor rewrite an
agreement, though he or she may make suggestions. In order to
effectively fulfill its role, the court should appoint at least one neutral
expert advisor to assist the court in identifying and examining any
antitrust issues concerning the agreement terms. This is important to
ensure the quality of review given the complexities of the HatchWaxman system and antitrust analysis. Furthermore, as discussed in
more details below,199 an appointed expert is instrumental in
facilitating the judicial review as expeditiously as possible.
Moreover, the court in the proposed procedure should play the
“role of a skeptical client and critically examine”200 the proposed
agreement for its potentially anticompetitive effects. This aspect is
crucial in order to protect the public interest, especially when the
adversarial nature of litigation is lost after parties agree to settle. As
the Hatch-Waxman Act encourages litigation to resolve patent
disputes,201 the court’s role as a “skeptical client” helps to retain an
adversarial flavor to the settlement process and to take into account
interests of non-parties who would be affected by the settlement. Also,
within the proposed settlement framework, courts are in a unique
position to mitigate the settling parties’ power imbalance. For
example, the court may raise concerns when the generic company
demands payment that is unreasonably high or a market entry date
that is too soon. This way, the court can protect the brand-name
company’s need to recover its investment in research, which ensures
continued development of new drugs. Furthermore, by allowing
generic entry at an appropriate time prior to the patent expiration, it
can facilitate an equitable and pro-competitive timing to introduce
lower-cost generic drugs into the market.
197

Id. § 21.632 at 321.
FED. R. EVID. 702; see also MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 321.
199
See discussion infra Part III.D.
200
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.61, at 310.
201
This is indicative by the automatic thirty-month stay of ANDA approval and 180day exclusivity period for first-filers. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), (iv) (2010).
198
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The court undertaking the proposed procedure may, just as in the
Rule 23(e) procedure, evaluate the settling parties’ agreement with or
without a preliminary hearing. This Comment, however, proposes to
diverge from Rule 23 by authorizing the court to issue a final (but
appealable) approval at this stage. This suggestion is largely motivated
by the need to expedite Paragraph IV settlement processes as
explained below.202 There may be various ways to accomplish this step,
but this Comment proposes a two-prong analysis: the first prong
comprising a categorical test; and the second involving the rule of
reason analysis.
Under the first prong, the court may apply pre-defined factors to
decide whether to order a formal hearing. For example, the court may
set the threshold “Settlement Competition Index (SCI)” beyond which
a formal hearing must be ordered.203 If a proposed agreement’s SCI
falls below a threshold value and thereby fails to trigger a formal
hearing order, the court may proceed to the second prong. Since the
settling parties have the burden of persuasion, they should be required
to submit any requisite calculations and/or analysis to the court, and
the court’s advisor may assist the judge in evaluating their work. With
the development of case law in the area, this prong should evolve into
a streamlined process.
If the triggering factors are not found in the first prong, the court
should proceed to the second prong and conduct the rule of reason
analysis, which has been employed in various antitrust cases to
interpret the federal Sherman Act204 and state antitrust laws.205 In
applying the rule of reason, the court must balance anticompetitive
202

See discussion infra Part III.D.
Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1328–48. Alternatively, a certain amount of
valuable consideration from the patentee may be a triggering factor. For instance, the
amount of considerations may be calculated using the method proposed in Aaron
Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16, 18. If the “otherwise
unexplained” portion of the patentee’s payment exceeds a predetermined limit, a
formal hearing may be ordered. See id.
204
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007)
(“The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains
trade in violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act].”); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5
(2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which
antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in
fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful.”); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400–01 (1948) (“We apply the ‘rule
of reason’ of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, to efforts to monopolize
through patents as well as in non-patent fields.”).
205
Wilcox et al., supra note 78, at 869 (discussing that many state laws track the
Sherman Act).
203
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harms and pro-competitive benefits to determine whether the
proposed agreement as a whole would unreasonably restrict
competition in the relevant market.206 If the court determines that the
proposed agreement raises antitrust concerns, it must order a formal
hearing.
One advantage of the second prong is that the court may freely
consider the merits of the case in applying the rule of reason analysis
because the case being settled is a patent infringement action and thus
is not bound by Actavis. This aspect is particularly significant because
“the likelihood that the patent will be held invalid or not infringed is
key to evaluating whether a settlement violates antitrust law.”207 It
would be necessary to take into account the maturity of the underlying
patent issue and “the probable outcome of a trial on the merits.”208
Additional factors that the court should consider include, in no
specific order and with no single factor being dispositive: the proposed
market entry date of the generic drug;209 whether there are other
companies that settled with respect to the same drug at issue;210
whether there are other agreements entered into by the same settling
parties;211 any other potentially anticompetitive provisions (e.g., no AG
provision212); the extent of antitrust injury to drug purchasers (e.g., the
extent of overcharge213); the brand-name company’s market power in
a defined market;214 the value of net considerations flowing from the
brand-name company to the generic company;215 and how other courts
have treated similar settlements in the past.216 With respect to the last
206
207

Id. at 840.
Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1336. See also supra note 129 and accompanying

text.
208

MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.62, at 316.
See, e.g., supra notes 30, 31, 73 and accompanying text. See also discussion supra
Part III.B.i regarding the court’s mitigation of power imbalance.
210
See, e.g., supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
211
See, e.g., supra note 99 and accompanying text.
212
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
213
See, e.g., supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
214
“[T]he conclusion that a particular tying arrangement involving a patent is
unlawful ‘must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by
a mere presumption thereof.’” Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1331 (quoting Illinois
Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S. 28, 43 (2006)).
215
See, e.g., Edlin et al., supra note 203, at 18 (describing a net consideration as a
total value of any consideration flowing from the patentee to the claimed infringer
minus the sum of the patentee’s avoided litigation costs and the value of goods,
services, or other consideration from the alleged infringer).
216
See discussion infra Parts III.B.ii & III.C.iii (discussing the notion that court
opinions create precedents).
209
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factor, certain forms of settlement may be considered a “safe-harbor.”
For instance, the Supreme Court stated in Actavis that parties “may, as
in other industries, settle . . . by allowing the generic manufacturer to
enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without
the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”217
ii. Parties’ Options After Preliminary Review
Under Rule 23, if a court approves a proposed settlement, an
order of approval should include the court’s findings and reasoning.218
An approved agreement is presumed legal, and both the court and the
parties must abide by the approved settlement terms.219 If the court’s
decision is appealed, the decision is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard.220 “An abuse of discretion may be found where the
‘district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact,
an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to
fact.’”221 Nevertheless, “[w]hether an incorrect legal standard has been
used is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo.”222
As discussed earlier, the proposed procedure allows the court to
issue an official approval if the court concludes, after the two-prong
analysis, that the proposed agreement does not violate the antitrust
laws. Similar to Rule 23(e), the court should be required to publish a
detailed explanation of the court’s findings and reasons for its
decision. This requirement serves the important purpose of building
precedents. As more lawsuits are settled via the proposed procedure,
the settlement procedure would require fewer costs and less time
because parties and courts can rely on prior decisions. Settling parties
may structure their agreements in conformity with past court opinions,
and this would improve predictability of the volume of future antitrust
lawsuits in the Hatch-Waxman realm.

217

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 13.14, at 172.
219
Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2011).
220
See, e.g., In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 589 F. App’x 53, 58 (3d Cir.
2014) (“We review a district court’s decision to . . . approve a settlement under the
abuse of discretion standard.”); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
review the determination of the district court [with respect to the approved
settlement] only for an abuse of discretion.”).
221
In re Nutella, 589 F. App’x at 58 (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.,
391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995))).
222
Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2012))).
218
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Parties in the proposed procedure should submit their approved
agreement to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice pursuant to the current regulation.223 One
significant difference from the current practice is that a judicially
approved agreement in the proposed procedure would be presumed
legal, and the FTC must appeal the agreement instead of initiating an
antitrust suit if it wishes to challenge the decision. Again, this
arrangement enhances parties’ confidence that the approved
agreement is legal and reduces future antitrust litigations.224 While the
appellate court may review the district court’s decision only under the
abuse of discretion standard, the presumptive legality may be void if
the settling parties failed to disclose information in connection with
the agreement prior to the approval either deliberately or
inadvertently.
If the judge determines that a formal hearing is required, the
settling parties should choose to: (1) move forward with the hearing;
(2) amend the proposed agreement to remove any obstacles to court
approval within a specified time limit; (3) continue to litigate
(pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman objectives); or (4) dismiss the case
under the condition that the plaintiff would not sue the defendant
based on the product proposed in the ANDA. If an amendment does
not result in court approval, the parties must proceed with the formal
hearing or continue to litigate. The parties may not appeal at this time.
C. Formal Hearing
i. The Court’s Notice to the FTC and the Public
Under Rule 23, the court must alert all class members to their
“opportunity to present their views” and hear others’ arguments
regarding the settlement terms.225 Members who wish to object to the
settlement (the “objectors”) must file written statements of their
objections within a specified time and notify the court if they also
intend to appear at the fairness hearing.226 Class counsel—attorneys
representing a class—must communicate any proposed settlement

223
224
225
226

MMA, supra note 13.
See also infra text accompanying notes 252–54.
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.633, at 321–22.
Id. § 21.633, at 322.
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terms to class representatives227 and, ultimately, to all class members.228
Class counsel may convey information to class members in a variety of
ways, such as holding a meeting (especially if the class is small), or by
creating a toll-free telephone number or a website to provide
settlement details and court-approved answers to frequently asked
questions.229 An objector who testifies at the hearing may be “any class
member who does not opt out” or any party to the settlement, such as
“a shareholder of a corporation involved in the settlement.”230
In the proposed procedure, the court should notify (or instruct
the settling parties to notify) the FTC and members of the public
before holding a formal hearing. Notices may be provided in
publications such as the Federal Register, magazines, newspapers, and
trade journals.231 It may also be appropriate to post notices on websites
or “in public places likely to be frequented by” potential objectors.232
The notice should include, for example, brief descriptions of the
proposed agreement, where additional information can be found, and
instructions on how to file objections within a specified time and on
how to notify the court if the objectors also intend to appear and testify
at the formal hearing. Settling parties may initially bear the cost of
preparing and distributing the notice and later share it with objectors
in agreed-upon proportions. Alternative arrangements are also
possible.
Objectors should include any members of the public, such as
consumers, wholesalers, retailers, and insurance companies, regardless
of their potential status as direct or indirect purchasers.233 Thus,
members of the public have the opportunity to object to a proposed
agreement before it could injure them. Moreover, the presence of
objectors would help to reinforce the adversarial character of the
proceeding.234 Any issues must be resolved before the agreement’s
227

A class representative is “a person named in the complaint as the plaintiff and
who has been determined by the court to be a legally ‘adequate’ person to represent
the interests of the class.” The Federal Class Action Practice Manual, Glossary of Legal Terms
Used
in
Class
Action
Litigation,
CLASS
ACTION
LITIG.
INFO.,
http://www.classactionlitigation.com/glossary.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
228
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.641, at 323.
229
Id. § 21.641, at 323–24.
230
Id. § 21.643, at 326.
231
See, e.g., id. § 21.311, at 287–88 (discussing various methods of distributing
certification notices to unidentifiable class members after reasonable effort).
232
Id. § 21.311, at 292.
233
The proposed procedure may raise an issue of objector standing. This
Comment refrains from exploring the topic.
234
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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approval. Those who fail to object during the specified time—
including the FTC—forfeit their right to object, appeal, or initiate an
antitrust action on the basis of the approved agreement in the future.
This way, the proposed procedure alleviates settled parties’ concern
that they might face antitrust liability years after their settlement takes
place. Both the objectors and settling parties may rely on previous
court decisions because the proposed procedure requires all courts to
prepare written opinions.
The court may appoint a public counsel, similar to a class counsel,
to be responsible for overseeing the notification procedure, and
communicating and coordinating with the objectors to consolidate
similar arguments. If no objection is raised within the specified time
period, the court should still hold a hearing perhaps with its advisor(s)
as an adversary to the settling parties.
ii. The Burden-Shifting Approach
In class action settlements, a court may approve a settlement only
if it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”235 At a Rule 23 fairness hearing,
settling parties may “present witnesses, experts, and affidavits or
declarations.”236 Objectors may also testify.237 Objectors may act
individually or on behalf of class members.238 The court may set time
limits on objectors’ arguments and refuse “to hear the same objections
more than once.”239 If objections are withdrawn, the court must
If withdrawn objections result in
approve the withdrawal.240
modifications to the settlement terms, the withdrawal is considered as
part of the settlement.241 The court may grant additional discovery if it
is necessary for the objectors to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
The discovery, however, should be limited and
settlement.242
conditioned on a showing of need.243
In the proposed procedure, the court should apply the rule of
reason analysis with a burden-shifting approach at the formal
hearing.244 The burden-shifting approach would require the objectors
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.634, at 322.
Id.
Id. § 21.643, at 327.
Id. § 21.634, at 322.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5); MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 328.
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 328.
Id. § 21.643, at 327–28.
Id. § 21.643, at 328.
James A. Keyte & Karen Lent, Reasonable as A Matter of Law: The Evolving Role of
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to first demonstrate likely anticompetitive effects of the settlement
agreement in a well-defined antitrust market. If the objectors are
successful, the settling parties must offer a pro-competitive
justification(s) for their proposed settlement. If the settling parties are
successful, the objectors must show that the settling parties’
justification(s) can be achieved through materially less restrictive
alternatives. If the objectors are successful, the court must weigh the
overall anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects to determine the
reasonableness of the settlement agreement. The court may follow the
general practice outlined in Rule 23 regarding limited discovery,
witnesses, experts, affidavits or declarations, and withdrawal. The
court must approve withdrawal of any objector,245 and if withdrawn
objections result in modifications to the settlement terms, the
withdrawal should be considered as part of the settlement. Even in the
absence or scarcity of objections, the court should consider diverse
interests of the affected parties and requisite factors before reaching
its decision.246
iii. Parties’ Options After the Formal Hearing
According to Rule 23(e), the court must ensure that there is a
sufficient record of the basis and justification for the court’s
conclusion247 and explain the findings to class members and the
appellate court in sufficient written detail.248 As mentioned previously,
an approved agreement is presumed legal,249 and the court’s decision
is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.250 The proposed
procedure should be set up in a way that improves predictability and
diminishes the likelihood that settled companies would face future
antitrust liability. Therefore, the courts’ decisions in the proposed
the Court in Rule of Reason Cases, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 62, 62 (discussing how
most courts employ a burden-shifting approach for antitrust claims that are not subject
to a per se rule or quick look approach); see also Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.:
When is the Rule of Reason Not the Rule of Reason?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 43–44
(2014).
245
See discussion infra Part III.D regarding objectors.
246
See MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.635, at 322–23.
247
Id.
248
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s
notes to 2003 Amendment.
249
Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2011).
250
See, e.g., In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 589 F. App’x 53, 58 (3d Cir.
2014) (“We review a district court’s decision to . . . approve a settlement under the
abuse of discretion standard.”); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
review the determination of the district court [with respect to the approved
settlement] only for an abuse of discretion.”).
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procedure should also be published, resulting in more consistent
decisions nationwide. This would also aid future Paragraph IV litigants
to structure their agreements if they wish to settle.
Furthermore, if the court approves an agreement in the proposed
procedure, the parties to the agreement should be allowed to act
immediately in accordance with the agreement. Only those who timely
objected may appeal the decision. The agreement is presumptively
legal and will be reviewed under a deferential standard, i.e., the abuse
of discretion standard as described above. As suggested earlier, if the
settling parties failed to disclose information in connection with the
agreement prior to the approval, the presumptive legality should be
void. A de novo review is proper only in limited circumstances such as
the parties’ failure to disclose pertinent side agreements or a clearly
erroneous application of law. Even if the approved agreement is
ultimately found unlawful, the settled parties should not be held liable
in future antitrust suits or penalized for their actions in accordance
with the agreement during the appeal period.
If the court disapproves the agreement after the formal hearing,
the settling parties may: (1) continue to litigate the patent
infringement case (in accordance with the objectives of the HatchWaxman Act); (2) amend the agreement within a specified time only
to the extent that it removes or corrects the anticompetitive aspect(s)
of the agreement; (3) appeal within a specified period; or (4) dismiss
the case under the condition that the plaintiff will not sue the
defendant based on the product proposed in its ANDA. In the interest
of saving time,251 the amended agreement of option (2) would not be
subject to a formal hearing, and if it does not result in an approval, the
parties must: (1) litigate; (3) appeal; or (4) dismiss. If the proposed
agreement is rejected on appeal, the parties may not attempt to settle
or amend again. The parties must choose between options (1) and
(4).
The improved predictability and confidence in the legality of
their settlements would encourage the brand-name companies to
invest in R&D and would relieve them from unnecessarily inflating the
non-R&D costs associated with their drugs. One commentator on
reverse payment settlements has proposed a model that demonstrates
the effect of the shift in legality of reverse payment settlements.252
According to the model, switching from a regime that legalizes reverse
payment settlements to a regime that illegalizes the settlements
251
252

See discussion infra Part III.D.
Mungan, supra note 146, at 41–44.
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increases incentives for brand-name companies to develop stronger
inventions rather than weaker inventions, therefore strengthening
their patents.253 The model also shows that a move toward illegalization
of reverse payment settlement deters generics from entering the
market when the patent is strong.254 The proposed procedure does not
illegalize reverse payment settlements, but rather makes it difficult for
brand-name companies to rely on unlawful ones. If this model
accurately forecasts the behaviors of brand-name and generic
companies, the proposed procedure would encourage strong
innovation.
D. A Strict Timeline is Required to Avoid Delays in the Settlement
Process
One significant challenge in implementing the proposed
procedure is to keep the procedure on a strict timeline and not to let
it serve as a substitute for a stay of Paragraph IV litigations.255 In class
actions, objections delay final resolution of a settlement by requiring
the court to consider objectors’ arguments.256 While bona fide
objectors can be beneficial, as they assist the court in identifying areas
of a settlement that need improvement,257 the resulting “holdup”
becomes more severe when objectors appeal, which can take years.258
Appeals are costly to class counsel as well as to non-objecting class
members because they are typically not entitled to payment “until the
legal process has run its course.”259 In contrast, objectors incur
relatively low cost because their pay is not dependent on settlement
approval, and they are able to minimize appellate litigation fees by
recycling widely applicable principles on which to base their
objections.260 Furthermore, an objector has an occasional incentive of
winning attorney fees if it succeeds in making changes to the
settlement in a way that benefits the class.261 The prospect of delay and

253

Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 41–42.
255
According to one estimate, even a one-year delay in generic entry costs
consumers about $661 million per drug. Hemphill, supra note 14, at 650 n.85.
256
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1624
(2009).
257
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 326.
258
Fitzpatrick, supra note 256, at 1624.
259
John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to Do
About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 865, 882 (2012).
260
Id. at 865, 878.
261
MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 326.
254
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financial loss has prompted many class counsels to pay objectors out of
their own pockets to withdraw the appeals.262 This dynamic has given
rise to a lawyer-driven phenomenon called “objector blackmail” by
which class members extract a payoff from class counsel by threatening
to file meritless appeals.263 Attorneys who routinely seek out class
actions and object on behalf of class members are called “professional
objectors,”264 of whom “[f]ederal courts are increasingly weary.”265
Paragraph IV litigations are different from class actions in this
regard because monetary awards are typically not involved,266 and
attorneys for both sides are paid by their clients. Moreover, a
settlement holdup would be desirable for both litigants in the HatchWaxman regime. If the proposed settlement procedure can be
dragged out as long as possible, the brand-name company benefits
from maintaining its status quo during that time—i.e., the ability to
charge monopoly prices—even if the proposed settlement is ultimately
rejected. The defendant generic company might play along if it
believes the later payout would outweigh the overall cost.
Furthermore, when a brand-name company owns multiple
patents of varying strengths covering a single drug, both the brandname and generic companies would likely benefit from prolonging the
settlement procedure. For example, one commentator pointed out a
situation in which a generic company prevails in a Paragraph IV
litigation involving a weak patent but there remains a strong patent
covering the same drug as the weak one.267 Because the strong patent
continues to block competition, the prevailing generic company is
effectively barred from marketing its generic product until the
expiration of the strong patent’s term. If the generic company is a firstfiler, its victory, which happens long before the expiration of the strong
patent, would result in a premature period of exclusivity that would
expire pursuant to the forfeiture provision.268 It would not be feasible
to wait to file an ANDA against the weak patent until the strong patent
262
263
264
265

Fitzpatrick, supra note 256, at 1624.
Id.
Id. at 1624–25; see also Lopatka & Smith, supra note 259, at 865–66.
O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa.

2003).
266

Note, however, that filing a frivolous claim might result in an award of attorneys’
fees to the other party. See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 549
F.3d 1381, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming the trial court’s award of over $16 million
in attorneys’ fees to plaintiff brand-name company because of defendant generic
firm’s baseless challenge to the brand-name’s patent).
267
Herman, supra note 56, at 1789.
268
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2010).
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is about to expire because winning the first-filer status is a race against
other generic companies. For these reasons, generic first-filers have
begun to request a stay of the Paragraph IV litigation for the weak
patent until closer to the expiration date of the strong patent.269 A stay,
followed by a generic victory, would allow the first-filing generic to
retain its 180-day exclusivity period and create a bottleneck even after
the strong patent expires. This “stay” scheme also benefits the brandname company because the exclusivity period running beyond the
expiry date of the last standing patent works to prevent full
competition.
In view of the forgoing, the proposed procedure should proceed
on a strict schedule and allow extension of deadlines only in
extraordinary circumstances. The aforementioned two-prong analysis
during the preliminary review phase270 and appointment of an expert
advisor271 are intended to facilitate a timely completion of the court’s
analysis. Additional tactics can be implemented to ensure expediency
of the proposed approval process, such as requiring the settling parties
to make their submissions as concise as possible, creating a template
for the court’s opinion, and expediting the appeal process. The court
should also have the power to terminate a settlement procedure if it
finds that settling parties are not negotiating in good faith or to impose
sanctions on a frivolous objector. Also, settling parties must be
prohibited from giving, lending, or promising valuable consideration
to or for any person, or from inducing another to object or appeal in
the proposed procedure. Finally, objectors should be required to
disclose their sponsors or any inducements they received during a
relevant time period. The inducements could come from not only the
settling parties, but also other generic companies interested in the
relevant market. The court should be cognizant of the financial
relationships among objectors and settling parties when considering
their arguments.

269

Herman, supra note 56, at 1789, 1808–13 (describing two cases involving a
motion to stay: Abbott Labs. v. Matrix Labs., Inc., No. 09-CV-1586, 2009 WL 3719214,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2009), and Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Parenteral Meds.,
Inc., Nos. 09-CV-105, 09-CV-204, 10-CV-137, 2010 WL 1507655, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 14,
2010)). In Abbott, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to stay the
Paragraph IV litigation for five years, which is about two years before the latest expiring
patent was set to expire. In Millennium, the court denied the defendant’s motion to
stay the Paragraph IV litigation for about two years.
270
See discussion supra Part III.B.i regarding the two-prong analysis.
271
See discussion supra Part III.B.i regarding expert advisor.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The current method of settling Paragraph IV litigations is replete
with problems. Because the Actavis framework is full of uncertainties,
settling parties currently cannot ensure the antitrust legality of their
agreements. Parties who have settled could be subject to antitrust
scrutiny several years after the settlement, which requires them to
revisit their settled case and incur additional costs. The power
imbalance between brand-name and generic companies in Paragraph
IV litigations, as well as the anticipated antitrust lawsuits, may cause
brand-name companies to divert resources from R&D and shift costs
to consumers. On the other hand, affected members of the public
cannot intervene before Paragraph IV settlements are finalized and are
unable to escape the effects of the settlement terms. Many consumers
who are injured as a result of a Paragraph IV settlement have no legal
recourse under the indirect purchaser rule, and even those consumers
who are entitled to bring an antitrust action may not have access to
relevant information.
The proposed procedure modeled after Rule 23(e) attempts to
alleviate these problems. For parties to Paragraph IV settlements, the
proposed procedure provides a process through which these parties
can obtain judicial approval of their agreement. Once approved, the
agreement is presumptively legal, which protects the settled parties
from future antitrust scrutiny. Moreover, since courts would be
required to issue an opinion describing their reasons for approval or
disapproval of each proposed agreement, parties who wish to settle in
the future would be able to utilize past court decisions as a guide to
structure their agreement.
The proposed procedure also addresses some of the public’s
concerns. First, settling parties would be required to submit their
proposed agreement to the court before they can settle. The court has
the authority to reject any unreasonably anticompetitive agreement
and therefore prevent antitrust injury to the public. Second, settling
parties must also submit any ancillary agreements in connection with
their proposed agreement. This obviates the need for interested
members of the public to search for related side deals. If settling
parties fail to disclose any material information, their agreement would
lose its presumptive legality. Third, the proposed procedure provides
an opportunity for members of the public to object to a proposed
agreement before it goes into effect. Fourth, the settling parties must
adhere to a strict timeline, and the parties’ options become limited
once they express their intent to settle. This restricts the parties’ ability
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to manipulate the settlement procedure.
The proposed procedure is intended to improve certainty as to
the antitrust legality of Paragraph IV settlements and prevent
unnecessary injury to the public. This Comment makes no claim that
the proposed procedure is ideal, and it would likely require further
adjustments. Nonetheless, the current mechanisms for settlement and
antitrust enforcement do not adequately balance the competing needs
to promote pharmaceutical innovation and to protect the public
welfare. A more preemptive and drastic approach is necessary and
desirable, especially in the absence of changes to the Hatch-Waxman
Act or antitrust laws.

